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The Great Divide2  
The Bali Action Plan, December 2007, that launched the 
process to negotiate a post-2012 climate agreement, uses the 
terms “developing country parties” and “developed country 
parties,” rather than the FCCC categories of  “Annex-I” and 
“non-Annex I” Parties indicating that at least some countries 
hoped thereby to open up the categories of  developing 
and developed countries for discussion. As Japan notes 
in its submission to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long 
term Cooperative Action, Parties will need to “clarify the 
definition of  ‘developed country Parties’ and ‘developing 
country Parties,’” and “identify the scope and criteria of  
those ‘developing country Parties’ required to take actions.” 
Most industrialized countries are in favour of  a more 
flexible and evolving categorisation of  Parties which will 
permit differences within and between developed and 
developing countries to be taken into account in fashioning 
obligations under the future climate regime. The US has long 
sought to differentiate between those developing countries 
that are major economies/emitters and those that are not. 
The recent multilateral initiatives the US has launched which 
include major economies/emitters alone (rather than all 
developing countries) stand testimony to this stance. Canada 
is similarly insistent that binding commitments be extended 
to all “major emitting economies.” The EU also believes that 
differences between developing countries must be taken into 
account, and that the economically advanced developing 
countries must make “fair and effective contributions” to the 
climate effort. 
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Introduction1
Since the dawn of  the intergovernmental dialogue on climate change, 
countries have bickered over who should take responsibility, in what measure 
and under what conditions to avert climate change. At the heart of  these 
questions in the ongoing negotiations on the post-2012 climate regime is the 
notion of  “differentiation.” The Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
1992 (FCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, 1997, differentiate between developing 
and industrialized countries, and assign a leadership role in mitigation to 
industrialized countries. Should the post-2012 climate regime differentiate 
between developing countries, based on “objective criterion,” in determining 
who, amongst them, should take greater responsibility, perhaps even akin to 
the responsibility that industrialized countries have currently assumed? 
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The rationale is simple and apparently neutral. As 
Australia points out, if  the GDP per capita of  FCCC Parties is 
taken as the benchmark there are “more non-Annex-I Parties 
that are advanced economies than existing Annex-I Parties.” 
They argue that the top 15 emitters are responsible for 3/4 
of  global greenhouse gases (GHGs) and they will have to act 
as part of  a 2012 agreement. There should, therefore, they 
argue, be an “objective” basis for graduation of  non-Annex 
I Parties to Annex I, “with a view to all advanced economies 
adopting a comparable effort towards the mitigation of  
greenhouse gas emissions.” In recent submissions various 
industrial countries have suggested indicative “objective” 
criteria including: 
• GDP per capita (Australia, Japan, Turkey 
and others) 
• relative rates of  economic and population 
growth, stage of  economic development, 
structuring of  economies emissions, 
recognition of  regional realities and 
interdependencies, relative mitigation 
potential and costs over time (Canada) 
• OECD membership, stages of  economic 
development, capacity to respond, and 
emission share in the world (Japan) 
• primary energy consumption per capita, 
R & D expendi-ture, emissions per capita, population 
growth, Human Development Index, historical 
responsibility and energy intensity (Turkey), and 
• global emissions and economic development (US).
Industrialized country submissions on differentiation 
carve out an exception for Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) who, in their view, cannot be expected to contribute 
significantly to the mitigation effort. It is worth noting in this 
context that the LDC, like the developing country, stamp is 
not an accurate descriptor for current social and economic 
ranking. Maldives, for instance, currently classified as an LDC 
has a higher per capita income and Human Development 
Index ranking than India, classified as a developing country. 
Several countries classified by the World Bank as low-income 
countries are not considered LDCs, and several LDCs are on 
the World Bank’s list of  middle-income countries.
Most developing countries, for their part, are opposed 
to any efforts to differentiate between them – both because 
such differentiation would threaten their leveraging power 
as well as destabilize the burden sharing architecture of  
the climate regime. Notwithstanding material differences, 
the 130 developing countries that form the G-77 share a 
common ideological vision and approach to international 
law, and they perceive efforts to differentiate between them 
as threatening their identity and leveraging power.  In the 
climate negotiations, the differences between members of  
the G-77, encompassing as it does both the oil exporting 
countries and the small island states, run deep. However the 
G-77 has thus far, but for a few notable occasions, exhibited 
a tenuous yet tenacious togetherness.
In the Accra negotiations in August 2008 the EU raised the 
issue of  differentiation between developing countries, which 
the EU noted was important to its political constituencies. 
The EU’s call for differentiation was supported by Australia, 
Japan, New Zealand, Turkey, and the US. The G-77 
responded that such differentiation between developing 
countries would entail a renegotiation of  the Convention 
and the Kyoto Protocol, which Parties had the sovereign 
right to attempt, but in the appropriate forum. The Bali 
Action Plan, in the G-77’s view, launched a process to close 
the implementation gap, not to discuss amendments to the 
Convention or Protocol. 
Dealing with Chindia: Levelling the playing field through 
Differentiation?  
Of  the objective criteria industrial countries have suggested 
for differentiation between countries, GDP per capita and 
emissions profiles figure in many submissions. If  these criteria 
are taken however, as Australia acknowledges, India and 
Indonesia do not figure in the mix.  Yet India, in particular, is 
very much at the centre of  the international full court press 
on climate change. India has low per capita (1.2 metric tons) 
and cumulative emissions (4.6% of  global emissions), is 128th 
on the Human Development Index, 44% of  its population 
lives without access to electricity, and an estimated 80% of  its 
population lives on less than US$2 a day. By most objective 
criteria India would not be required to prioritise mitigation 
commitments. It is nevertheless a country that is at the top 
of  the industrialized world’s list of  “advanced developing 
countries,” “emerging economies,” “major economies” etc. 
This is presumably due to its healthy economic growth rate, 
attendant competitiveness concerns in developed countries, 
and its projected emissions growth trajectory. India’s projected 
emissions growth rate is certainly a relevant factor, but it is 
unclear to what extent, given the fickle nature of  economic 
growth on which it is dependent (ever more evident in the 
ongoing financial crisis), and the impact that climate change 
is likely to have on India’s monsoons to which its economy is 
anchored. India’s projected emissions growth rate may not 
therefore be sufficient to make the case for it to be treated 
as an “advanced developing country” in the regime today. 
So why then is India clubbed together with China, to form 
Chindia, the intended target of  the call for differentiation?
It is questionable if competitiveness fears in 
the industrialized world are legitimate concerns 
within the climate regime, and indeed if 
differentiation between developing countries 
should be used to address such fears.
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The answer at least in part lies in the competitiveness 
concerns that appear to implicitly drive negotiating positions 
in the climate regime. A draft version of  the EU’s third-
phase emissions trading scheme contained in Article 29 a 
border carbon adjustment measure titled Future Allowance 
Import Requirement (FAIR). While the FAIR provision has 
been dropped for now, the EU appears ready to keep an 
open mind on measures to obtain a “level playing field” for 
its industries. The US is also considering a similar carbon 
equalization measure in the proposed American Climate 
Security Act, 2007 and the Bingaman-Specter Low Carbon 
Economy Act. Needless to say, there is little sympathy for 
such concerns in countries like India. India’s ambassador to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) has warned the EU of  
retaliation and litigation if  it implements such trade restrictive 
measures.  The WTO Appellate Body in the Shrimp-Turtle 
case made it clear that however legitimate the policy goal 
“unilateral and non-consensual procedures” will be viewed 
with suspicion.  It is questionable if  competitiveness fears 
in the industrialized world are legitimate concerns within 
the climate regime, and indeed if  differentiation between 
developing countries should be used to address such fears. 
Applying Objective Criteria Objectively 
Notwithstanding their espousal of  it, it is intriguing that 
differentiation on objective criteria is not a method that 
industrialized countries followed, or are likely to follow, to 
differentiate between themselves or their GHG mitigation 
targets in the climate regime.  Both the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee in the run-up to the FCCC, and 
the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate in the run-up to 
Kyoto, discussed criteria for inclusion into the annexes, but 
these discussions proved bootless. The rough rule of  thumb 
followed was that members of  the OECD and those countries 
with economies in transition were included in Annex I of  
the FCCC and OECD members were included in Annex 
II. The emphasis was on auto-election (either directly or 
through membership in a political/economic organization) 
not on differentiation based on objective criteria. The targets 
chosen were also nationally determined and internationally 
negotiated. They were not listed according to objective 
criteria. If  they had been the US would have had a far more 
onerous commitment. 
The only method industrial countries countenance is 
one that respects their sovereign choice and autonomy, 
albeit within a negotiated context, not one based on 
objective criteria, which would in effect limit the scope for 
deal-seeking. The current negotiations in the Ad Hoc open-
ended Working Group to consider further commitments for 
developed countries beyond 2012 under the Kyoto Protocol 
(AWG-KP) and the Bali Action Plan are focused on actions/
commitments that are nationally determined and tailored 
and then internationally negotiated. If  a departure from 
this approach and differentiation on objective criteria is to 
be explored, perhaps differentiation between all countries 
and targets could be implemented based on internationally 
negotiated objective criteria? Needless to say, most developing 
countries would emphasize historical responsibility and per 
capita emissions use, as their preferred objective criteria and 
the negotiations would grind to a halt.
A Way Forward: Differentiation in Actions 
To be clear, differentiation between countries, developed 
and developing, is in principle, desirable. Ambiguity in the 
classification of  countries creates a legitimacy 
deficit in the system. It can hamper efficient 
distribution of  scarce resources. And, it can 
prevent identification of  those countries that 
bear greater responsibility for contributing 
to climate change. This is true between 
developing countries as well as between 
developed and developing countries. It is also 
desirable that there are limits to differential 
treatment in the climate regime, a theme I 
have explored at length elsewhere. What is 
not acceptable is first, that differentiation on 
seemingly objective criteria is used to address 
competitiveness concerns, and second, that standards for 
differentiation prescribed for developing countries are not 
countenanced for industrialized ones. The use of  such 
criteria reduces the space for negotiation, for political jostling 
and deal-seeking, and either it should be effected across the 
board to level the playing field or not at all. 
A preferred alternative to differentiation between developing 
countries based on objective criteria would be differentiation 
in actions, in combination with auto election. In theory at 
least, three methods exist to categorize parties to international 
treaties: the definition, list, and auto-election methods. In the 
definition method, the treaty provides criteria based on which 
categories of  parties are identified (and across the gamut of  
new generation multilateral environmental negotiations, not 
a single definition of  “developing countries” exists). In the list 
method, the treaty creates lists that include relevant parties, 
and, in the auto-election method, parties elect themselves to 
a particular category. The list and the auto-election method 
are not mutually exclusive. Parties can elect themselves to 
particular lists created by the treaty. These lists could be of  
Parties or actions. And, countries could elect themselves to 
perform actions which appear in a particular list.
Given that most industrialized countries have 
had limited success in meeting their Kyoto 
commitments, their grasp on the high ground 
in pressing developing countries to take such 
action is tenuous.
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South Africa in a recent submission suggested the creation 
of  a register of  mitigation actions by developing countries 
which combines the list and auto-election methods, and is 
a useful model to pursue. A register would be created by a 
COP decision and maintained by the Secretariat. It would 
list actions rather than countries. And, it would permit 
developing countries to elect to implement certain actions 
conditional on the provision of  appropriate international 
support. The register would allow actions currently being 
undertaken in developing countries to be recognized, and it 
would enable the implementation of  proposed actions which 
require support. The registry would permit an accurate 
evaluation not just of  each country’s climate performance, 
but also of  emission trends across developing countries. 
Should such a voluntary approach not catalyze a trend 
towards the requisite deviation (15-30% below baseline) for 
developing countries, Parties could review and reassess the 
level of  effort required.
 It is worth referring in passing to countries like Mexico 
and the Republic of  Korea, that are members of  OECD, 
Singapore, which is ranked 25th in the Human Development 
Index, and Cyprus and Malta, which are now EU member 
states. These countries are currently non-Annex I countries. 
Differentiation in actions may be inappropriate for these 
countries, given their relative wealth and capacity, and 
their membership in organizations signifying such wealth 
and capacity. These countries could in the context of  their 
membership in the OECD or EU be requested to elect 
themselves to FCCC Annex I. The process of  amending 
the Annexes, whilst tedious and time consuming, is not 
impossible.
Conclusion: The Key to Developing Country Engagement
If  developing countries are to participate proactively in 
the climate challenge, persuasion not coercion is key. As a 
first step, the global regime must reinforce the confidence-
building architecture of  the climate treaties, not destabilize 
them, which implies both that industrialized countries must 
lead by example (thus far only in patchy evidence), and that 
they must operationalize and go beyond, in real, concrete 
and credible ways the financing and technology provisions 
of  the climate treaties. Given that most industrialized 
countries have had limited success in meeting their Kyoto 
commitments, their grasp on the high ground in pressing 
developing countries to take such action is tenuous. Financing 
will need to be the centrepiece of  the deal in Copenhagen. 
The FCCC Secretariat estimates that mitigation measures 
needed to return global GHG emissions to current levels 
require additional investment and funding of  between 200 
and 210 billion USD in 2030, and adaptation measures will 
require several tens of  billions of  USD. Although seemingly 
large, this sum is small in relation to estimated world GDP 
(0.3 to 0.5%) and global investment (1.1 to 1.7%) in 2030, 
and insignificant compared to the damage that uncontrolled 
climate change will wreak. The current levels of  funding 
by industrialized countries are limited and will need to be 
stepped up significantly. 
In addition the global regime must offer developing 
countries attractive opportunities to engage. It must 
recognize and reward actions that are currently being taken, 
and create the conditions necessary to tempt them to take 
further commitments. The emphasis in this context must 
be on auto-election by countries, not forcible differentiation 
(on debatable indicators) and binding targets. This is not 
just because differentiation in its current avatar is politically 
controversial, questionably motivated, and inconsistently 
applied but also because a well designed system with built-
in incentives and disincentives will achieve, without friction, 
effective differentiation in actions. 
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